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1. Executive summary 
The academic and practitioner literature on tax reform, and comments from several experts 
contacted in connection with this report, emphasise that improving the performance of tax 
systems is highly complex and context-specific, without simple or direct answers.  Improvements 
are only likely to come from combinations of large and small changes made with close and 
detailed knowledge of particular circumstances.  Case studies reported by ITC-OECD (2015) 
report many different elements to reforms and difficulty in attributing improved results.  A joint 
IMF, OECD, UN, and World Bank Group report acknowledges that building tax capacity in 
wealthy countries “has been the work of centuries” and that “no easy or quick fixes for 
establishing broad fiscal capacity” should be expected, although “patient, focused reform can 
achieve a great deal” (IMF et al. 2016, pp. 10-11).   
2 
Political will and the political economy context are broadly seen as crucial for reforms to 
increase tax revenues.  Politically-informed approaches are likely to have the best results.  Tax 
reform can encounter strong vested interests resistant to reform, especially from elites who may 
bear the greatest burden of taxation. Political economy analysis can help identify opposition to 
reform and 'windows of opportunity' for reform such as can occur during periods of fiscal crisis or 
political transition.  Successful strategies which work with the political economy context include: 
phasing in tax increases gradually; obscuring the impact of tax reforms; appealing to fairness and 
equity; linking reform to specific benefits; engaging with networks and institutions; building reform 
coalitions; and a flexible, pragmatic approach. 
Supporting a culture of paying appropriate taxes: Tax morale and tax compliance are 
improved by public perceptions of fairness in the tax system and the belief that tax money will be 
well spent. Efforts to support a taxpaying culture include outreach and education, improving 
payment and processing services, and credible tax evasion deterrence and enforcement. Tax 
morale  is significantly correlated with tax effort and tax compliance in both high-income and 
developing countries (Daude et al., 2012; OECD, 2013a), but evidence on increasing tax morale 
to create a culture supportive of taxpaying is primarily based on econometric analysis using 
public opinion surveys, with few rigorous evaluations of efforts to create a taxpayer culture. 
Value-added tax is already widespread, but its introduction was a highly effective tax reform 
across Africa the 1990s and 2000s.  VAT is now widely used, but there may still be scope to 
improve its effectiveness.  Property taxes are widely regarded as progressive, efficient, and 
equitable, but there are challenges both with technical implementation and popularity. 
Taxing the informal sector has potential to broaden the tax base and there is evidence that it 
may contribute to a better business environment and even to productivity and growth, but is 
unlikely to generate significant tax revenue.   
Local government taxation has received relatively little attention to date, but because the links 
between taxation and spending at the local level are potentially more direct, tax reform at this 
level may contribute to statebuilding and state-society relations.  Various approaches have been 
suggested, but there is little robust evidence of the impact of local taxation reform.     
Aid can either reinforce or undermine tax systems, depending on how it is channelled.  Donor 
coordination on tax reform is important, along with national government ownership and alignment 
with priorities and transparency.  There have been strong calls to end tax exemptions on aid-
funded goods and services, in order to reinforce norms of tax compliance and reduce 
administration costs. 
Experts agree that building a well-functioning administration capacity is crucial to tax reform.  
Key elements include capacity building with a focus on staff training and retention, improvements 
in data management and information technology, incentives for automatic enrolment, and varying 
approaches to enforcing tax compliance. Reorganisation of revenue administration according to 
taxpayer size rather than tax type has also been a successful innovation.  Countries vary widely 
in tax capacity and different countries will require different capacity building strategies for 
increasing revenue. 
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2. Political will and the political economy context 
Tax reform can encounter strong vested interests resistant to reform, especially from elites who 
may bear the greatest burden of taxation. Political economy analysis
1
 can help to identify 
opposition to reform from powerful elites and lobbies (de Souza, 2013), and to identify 'windows 
of opportunity'
2
 for reform such as can occur during periods of fiscal crisis or political transition 
(Prichard et al., 2012). 
Political will is considered crucial to increasing revenues from tax policy reforms (Giulia Mascagni 
2017, personal communication) and politically informed approaches are likely to have the best 
results (Rhiannon McCluskey 2017, personal communication).  Political will is also required to 
ensure revenue collection procedures are fair and that there is enforcement to instil trust 
(Monkam and Moore, 2015).   
Jibao and Prichard (2013) highlight the centrality of political will for successful reform in their 
study of rebuilding local governance finance in Sierra Leone. They determine three factors 
affecting strong political leadership: “the relationship between political and economic elites, the 
relationship between local and central political parties, and the extent of local-level political 
competition” (p. 3). These relationships vary between contexts and different taxes. Jibao and 
Prichard also promote the need for strategies to be contractual so that political will is sustained 
and reforms can increase revenue long-term.  On the other hand, a case study of Cameroon 
highlights where lack of political will led to failure in tax reforms (Raballand and Rajaram, 2013). 
A World Bank funded project aimed to develop public financial management and strengthen 
accountability. Delays in building consensus within the Ministry of Finance led to hampered 
progress as did organisational deficiencies and lack of leadership. The imposition of 
development, in this case, appears to be a factor in failure and highlights the need to consider 
behaviour change strategies. 
Emerging evidence from regional and country case studies suggests several strategies that have 
helped to minimise resistance to reform, and to align reform with the political economy context 
(Fairfield, 2013; Hassan & Prichard, 2013; Jibao & Prichard, 2013; Booth, 2014; Fjeldstadt, 
2005):  
 phasing in tax increases gradually  
 obscuring the impact of tax reforms  
 appealing to fairness and equity  
                                                   
1
 ‘Political economy analysis aims to situate development interventions within an understanding of the prevailing 
political and economic processes in society – specifically, the incentives, relationships, distribution and 
contestation of power between different groups and individuals – all of which greatly impact on development 
outcomes.’ (Mcloughlin, 2012, p.5). For further information on political economy analysis see Mcloughlin, C. 
(2012). Topic Guide on Political Economy Analysis. Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham. 
http://www.gsdrc.org/go/topic-guides/political-economy-analysis  
2
 ‘‘Windows of opportunity’ occur when political economy factors align so as to enable progress' (Rao, 2013, 
p.14). For further information on 'windows of opportunity' see section 4.2 Flexibility, pragmatism, and being 
vigilant for opportunities in Rao, S., (2013). Civil service reform: Topic guide. Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, 
University of Birmingham. http://www.gsdrc.org/go/topic-guides/civil-service-reform  
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 linking reform to specific individual, general, and/or elite benefits 
 engaging with both formal and informal (e.g. family) networks and institutions 
 modest and targeted international support  
 central government support in the case of local taxation 
 high-level leadership to overcome powerful elites 
 building reform coalitions  
 strategies of negotiation and bargaining with taxpayers rather than simply relying on 
coercion 
 focusing on flexible goals and feasible reforms, rather than pursuing ideal reforms and 
predetermined blueprints. 
Key readings 
Fairfield, T. (2013). Going Where the Money Is: Strategies for Taxing Economic Elites in 
Unequal Democracies. World Development, 47, 42-57. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.02.011  
This peer-reviewed journal article, based on a literature review and qualitative analysis, identifies 
six strategies that help facilitate tax reform by mobilising popular support or moderating 
antagonism by economic elites: (1) a ‘foot-in-the-door’ approach of gradually phasing in taxes or 
incremental increases; (2) reducing taxpayers’ awareness of the tax burden by using taxes with 
less visibility, such as social security taxes deducted at source rather than direct income taxes; 
(3) emphasising fairness or equity, such as implementing progressive and targeted taxes and 
ensuring that everyone of similar means bears similar tax burdens; (4) linking tax reforms and 
increases to the provision of popular benefits; (5) linking reforms to broad public goods such as 
national security or prestige, socio-political stability, or economic stability; and (6) compensating 
elites by providing targeted benefits such as tax cuts or subsidies that benefit them.  
Case studies of reforms in Latin America provide some evidence about how these strategies 
have played out in reality.  In Chile, the success of reforms in 2001 and 2005 that broadened the 
tax base was attributed to successful appeals to legitimacy in spite of businesses’ strong political 
power.  In Argentina in the 1990s, obfuscating the impact of taxes helped build support to 
circumvent resistance from financial-sector elites, although not permanently.  In Bolivia in 2003, 
failure to adequately emphasise fairness and equity contributed to confusion and eventually anti-
tax protests.  The study concludes that in general, reforms are more likely to succeed if they are 
incremental rather than comprehensive, if they are supported by multiple strategies applied 
simultaneously, and if they are tailored to the particular context at hand.  
Hassan, M. & Prichard, W. (2013). The Political Economy of Tax Reform in Bangladesh: 
Political Settlements, Informal Institutions and the Negotiation of Reform. Working Paper 
14. International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD). Brighton: Institute of 
Development Studies. http://www.ictd.ac/sites/default/files/ICTD%20WP14.pdf  
This literature review and case study of Bangladeshi tax reform over the last two decades 
emphasises the importance of understanding both informal and formal institutions, as well as the 
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micro-level incentives which shape tax negotiation. The study finds that the Bangladesh tax 
system is characterised by high levels of discretion and corruption underpinned by robust 
informal institutions. These serve the core interests of political, economic and administrative 
actors across society and include elites, as well as rank and file revenue staff. The paper notes 
there are risks for certain actors from the continued informality, and that recent shifts in the 
influence of informal networks, and instances in which the tax system has been deployed against 
political opponents, may strengthen support for tax reform.  
Jibao, S. & Prichard, W. (2013). Rebuilding Local Government Finance After Conflict: The 
Political Economy of Property Tax Reform in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone. Working Paper 
12. International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD). Brighton: Institute of 
Development Studies. http://www.ictd.ac/sites/default/files/ICTD%20WP12.pdf  
This literature review and case study of relatively successful local property tax reforms in the four 
largest city councils in Sierra Leone highlights three key messages about the determinants of 
successful reform. The paper argues that: (1) modest and targeted support from the international 
community and the central government has been critical; (2) success is dependent on high-level 
leadership to overcome resistance, particularly from large property owners; and (3) reform 
strategies that are comparatively contractual (i.e. characterised by institutionalised, negotiable 
methods of assessing and collecting revenue) can contribute to a virtuous cycle of improved 
governance, and help to build sustainable political support for continued reform. The paper also 
notes that tax reform depends on long-term, hands-on, local-level partnerships. 
Booth, D. (2014). Aiding Institutional Reform in Developing Countries: Lessons from the 
Philippines on what works, what doesn’t and why. The Asia Foundation and the Overseas 
Development Institute. http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-
opinion-files/8978.pdf  
This literature review and case study analysis on the effects of reforms to alcohol and tobacco 
taxes and property law in the Philippines in 2012 highlights the role of reform coalitions. The 
paper argues that a core group of actors within and outside government were able to address the 
coordination problems that normally afflict broad-based campaigns, make tactical decisions 
about how to divide the opposition, and make alliances without the need for consensus other 
than on the reform objective itself. Key recommendations from the paper are building tacit 
coalitions in a pragmatic way, avoiding being trapped in a predetermined blueprint of reform, 
avoiding reforms that are likely to meet greatest resistance, and pursuing the best possible policy 
changes, given the context. 
Fjeldstad, O-H. (2005). Corruption in Tax Administration: Lessons from Institutional 
Reforms in Uganda. CMI Working Paper 2005:10. 
http://www.cmi.no/publications/2005/wp/wp2005-10.pdf  
A case study in Uganda looked at why tax reform efforts failed to remedy falling revenue levels 
and increased perceptions of corruption in the Ugandan Revenue Agency. Reforms that stressed 
monetary rewards and incentives may have failed because of the importance of family networks. 
Increased salaries may mean officials pay out more to meet extensive social obligations, and in 
some cases actually result in a net loss to the individual. Effective reforms may need to work 
with, or interrupt, the influence of kin-based networks. One such approach could be in-kind 
benefits which the author suggests are popular with civil servants partly because they are harder 
to share. 
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3. Supporting a culture of paying appropriate taxes  
Tax morale
3
 is significantly correlated with tax effort and tax compliance in both high-income and 
developing countries (Daude et al., 2012; OECD, 2013a). Evidence on increasing tax morale to 
create a culture supportive of taxpaying is primarily based on econometric analysis using public 
opinion surveys, with few rigorous evaluations of efforts to create a taxpayer culture. 
Public perceptions of fairness in the tax system and the belief that tax money will be well spent 
are highlighted in many studies as being important to tax morale and compliance (Fjeldstad & 
Heggstad, 2012; Ali, Fjeldstad, & Sjursen, 2013; OECD, 2013a). Tax morale tends to be 
correlated with support for democracy, age, claiming a faith or religious identity, higher 
education, and being employed full-time; there is also weak and contested evidence that women 
may have higher tax morale than men (OECD, 2013a). Afrobarometer survey data in Kenya, 
Tanzania, Uganda and South Africa shows that tax morale and compliance are positively 
associated with credible enforcement, satisfaction with public service provision and avoidance of 
payments to non-state actors, perceptions of other people’s compliance, a sense that one’s 
ethnic group is fairly treated, and tax knowledge and awareness (Ali et al., 2013). However, the 
significance of these factors varies from one country to another.  Another study in Mozambique, 
Tanzania, and Zambia also noted the importance of: a sense of a moral obligation to pay; the 
magnitude of the tax burden; ease of compliance; speed and accuracy of detection of non-
compliance and corrective measures; and severity of deterrent measures (Fjeldstad & Heggstad, 
2012). Many of the factors associated with compliance are interconnected. 
Key measures to improve compliance are outreach and education, improving payment and 
processing services, and credible deterrence and enforcement (OECD, 2013a; 2013b). Outreach 
can be through business or civil society associations which allow discussion or bargaining 
between government and citizens on tax issues. Education can be through different forms of 
media and schooling, and can involve teaching tax payers their responsibilities, how to pay their 
taxes, and how tax money will be spent. Modernising tax administration can improve tax related 
processes; credible deterrence requires accurate identification of tax evaders and appropriate 
punishment. Identifying the range of citizens' attitudes towards tax can improve targeting of tax 
compliance programmes. 
A pilot project in Rwanda examined the use of information letters on whether or not taxpayers 
would voluntarily correct their tax declarations, and found that voluntary compliance increased 
and negative revisions were reduced. The effectiveness of different messages and delivery 
methods on compliance behaviour was tested, and the best responses were found to be from 
more friendly messages – gentle reminders of deadlines or information on the importance of tax 
for public services.  Emails and Short Message Service (SMS) messages were found to achieve 
good results and to be cost-effective means of reaching large numbers of taxpayers. 
(McCluskey, 2016a) 
Reliance on the population in the form of self-assessment is an attractive idea for reform. Moore 
(2013) notes that although this is beginning in Africa there is “little hard information on the extent 
of progress” (p. 30). Bird (2011) notes some success in self-assessment for property tax in 
Bogota, Colombia but cautions this method. There may be failure to capture the value of publicly-
provided amenities, and increased yields that occur are unlikely to be sustained without enforced 
                                                   
3
 'The motivation of a country’s citizens to paying taxes, in addition to legal obligations' (Daude et al., 2012, p.9). 
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assessment (ibid). Analysis of tax compliance attitudes in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and South 
Africa finds tax knowledge and awareness to be important and beneficial (Ali et al., 2013). 
Key readings 
OECD. (2013a). What drives tax morale? Draft for consultation. Paris: OECD.  
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-global/TaxMorale_march13.pdf   
This draft policy brief is based on a literature review and econometric analysis using global public 
opinion surveys. The brief suggests that civil society, business organisations and the 
international development community could support the efforts of governments to improve tax 
morale and tax compliance by: strengthening and clarifying the links between revenue and 
expenditure, analysing citizens’ attitudes and perceptions towards tax, understanding the 
informal sector better, increasing the transparency of tax policy making, modernising tax 
administration procedures and aligning efforts in different areas to avoid negative interactions 
among the drivers of taxpayer compliance behaviour (opportunity, economy, social norms, 
fairness and trust, and deterrence)
4
. 
OECD. (2013b). Overview: A new era for taxpayer education. Chapter 1 in Building Tax 
Culture, Compliance and Citizenship: A Global Source Book on Taxpayer Education. Draft 
for consultation. Paris: OECD. http://www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-global/sourebook-taxpayer-
education.pdf  
This background chapter is based on a review of academic and policy literature and is an 
introduction to a book of 28 case studies on taxpayer education, mostly from developing 
countries. Taxpayer education includes government programmes to encourage tax-compliant 
behaviour, efforts by business organisations to mobilise and represent the interests of their 
members, and civil society initiatives to bring citizens into tax policy debates.  To build a tax 
culture, it is important to teach taxpayers how to file their taxes, keep them informed of changes 
in tax laws, encourage people to pay their taxes, and educate schoolchildren and university 
students in tax literacy. Taxpayer education can be conducted via internet-based technologies, 
television and entertainment media, and outreach to the informal sector. The chapter 
recommends exchanging knowledge and sharing best practices on taxpayer education; 
measuring the impact of taxpayer education initiatives in terms of enhanced compliance; 
expanding regional co-operation following the Latin America and Caribbean model; and 
increasing development co-operation support on taxpayer education. 
Fjeldstad, O-H., & Heggstad, K. K. (2012). Building taxpayer culture in Mozambique, 
Tanzania and Zambia: Achievements, challenges and policy recommendations. CMI 
Report, 2012(1). http://www.cmi.no/publications/publication/?4499=building-taxpayer-
culture-in-mozambique  
This study, based on a literature review and interviews, examines citizen attitudes to tax, 
taxpayer education, and government-citizen tax engagement measures. Enhancing compliance 
is generally though taxpayer education and outreach to ensure that taxpayers are aware of their 
                                                   
4
 For further information the drivers of taxpayer compliance behaviour see Forum on Tax Administration: 
Small/Medium Enterprise (SME) Compliance Subgroup (2010). Information Note Understanding and Influencing 
Taxpayers’ Compliance Behaviour. OECD. http://www.oecd.org/ctp/administration/46274793.pdf  
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obligations; taxpayer services to ensure that tax payment and processing are simple and easy; 
and credible deterrence and enforcement. The paper does not evaluate these approaches. 
Factors affecting compliance include: people’s sense of moral obligation to pay; the extent to 
which taxpayers believe that the government spends their tax money wisely; fair and transparent 
treatment of taxpayers; the magnitude of the tax burden; the ease of tax compliance; the speed 
and accuracy of detection of non-compliance and corrective measures; the severity of deterrents; 
perceptions of whether others are paying their fair share; and taxpayer knowledge.  
Ali, M., Fjeldstad, O.-H., & Sjursen, I. H. (2013). To pay or not to pay? Citizens' attitudes 
towards taxation in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and South Africa. Afrobarometer Working 
Paper no. 143. East Lansing: Afrobarometer. 
http://www.afrobarometer.org/files/documents/working_papers/Afropaperno143.pdf   
Based on the 2011/12 Afrobarometer survey data, this econometric analysis identifies factors 
that determine citizens’ attitudes towards tax-compliance in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and South 
Africa. The factors varied between countries, but attitudes to paying taxes were found to be more 
favourable when people perceive that there is credible enforcement to prevent tax evasion, are 
satisfied with provision of public services which they feel are important, do not have to pay non-
state actors (e.g. criminal gangs) for services, perceive others to be tax-compliant, and have tax 
knowledge and awareness. Citizens’ perception of how their ethnic group is treated by the 
government was associated with tax compliance in South Africa and Tanzania, but not in Kenya 
or Uganda. The study found no strong evidence of a relationship between tax compliance and 
trust in government and political legitimacy. 
4. Value-added tax and property tax 
Mick Moore of the International Centre for Tax and Development argues that the most effective 
single reform has been the introduction of value-added taxes (VAT), which are now in operation 
in virtually every country where it is feasible to do so (Moore 2017, personal communication).  
The introduction of VAT stimulated common approaches among revenue administrators across 
Africa, promoted and benefited from the spread of ICTs in business and government, required 
tax agencies to invest in recruiting and training skilled accountants, and marked a trend towards 
more cooperative tax collection and increasing compliance on the part of taxpayers (Moore 
2013b).  VAT has been challenged as being regressive, but in most countries reductions or 
exemptions for basic consumption items such as food lessen the burden on the poor (Fjeldstad 
and Iversen 2015, p. 2).  VAT is now widely used; for example, about 80% of sub-Saharan 
African countries levy a VAT, contributing about one quarter of total tax revenue (Fjeldstad and 
Iversen 2015, p. 2).  However, there is still scope to improve its effectiveness (Moore 2017, 
personal communication).   
Property tax is widely regarded as progressive and equitable because the sum due is 
determined by wealth rather than being a percentage on transactions (Monkam and Moore 2015, 
p. 3).  It is the most viable, efficient, and progressive means of raising local government revenue, 
but property tax collection remains very low in the developing world, and academic research on 
the topic is limited (McCluskey 2016b).  In contrast to consumption taxes such as VAT, where 
payments are made by a small number of businesspeople and are spread across many 
transactions, an annual property tax is highly visible to ordinary taxpayers, which may promote 
accountability but does not make it popular (Monkam and Moore, 2015).   
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Effective property taxation requires established and well-organised property markets which can 
be a problem, particularly with property valuation. This type of taxation can be expensive to 
administer, scope for discretion can be a problem and the confrontation required for collection 
makes it less attractive (Bird 2011).  Area-based (as opposed to value-based) assessment is one 
way to simplify this as administrative burden is reduced but it is regressive and the likelihood of 
underpayment is increased (Monkam and Moore, 2015).  Jibao and Prichard (2013) find 
successful property tax reforms in Sierra Leone enabled by modest and targeted support from 
the international community, high-level reform leadership to overcome resistance, and strategies 
that are contractual helping to build sustainable political support.  
5. Taxing the informal sector 
The informal sector consists of firms and individuals who are not fully registered and regulated, 
and therefore not in the standard tax net. Taxing the informal sector can be through registration 
and formalisation to push these firms and individuals into the tax net, or it can be through taxing 
them indirectly. In most countries there are several types of business registration and varying 
degrees of formalisation. 
Formalisation can encourage business growth, create a better business environment, and help 
build a culture of tax compliance (Joshi, Prichard & Heady, 2014). An economic modelling study 
suggests that full enforcement of taxation on the informal sector would increase labour 
productivity and output through reducing economic distortions (Leal Ordóñez, 2014). However, it 
is unlikely that taxing the informal sector through formalisation of all firms would bring in 
significant tax revenues at least in the short- and medium-term (de Mel, McKenzie & Woodruff, 
2013; Bruhn & McKenzie, 2014; Joshi et al., 2014). In general, a firm’s decision whether to 
formalise or not is based on an analysis of the costs (which can include higher taxes) and 
benefits (such as growing the business through official advertising and access to credit markets) 
(de Mel et al., 2013). For some firms, especially small and micro-enterprises, formalisation would 
not be beneficial (McKenzie & Sakho, 2010), even when formalisation is cheap and straight-
forward. Simplifying and lowering the cost of registration was found to have little or no effect on 
getting small firms to formalise, according to a review of econometric evidence (Bruhn & 
McKenzie, 2014).  
To tax firms while they remain informal, the guidance literature, based on econometric analyses 
and literature reviews, suggests taxing the goods and services that they buy and sell (through 
sales or value-added taxes) or through 'presumptive'
5
 or withholding
6
 taxes (Joshi et al., 2014). 
Another approach is to delegate the role of collecting tax to trade unions, business or other 
associations (Joshi & Ayee, 2008). Tax administrations may need to reorganise, as the informal 
sector can be difficult to reach through large bureaucracies (Joshi & Ayee, 2008).  
                                                   
5
 Examples of presumptive taxes include fixed lump sums depending on the tax entity's occupation or sector, a 
minimum tax based on the assumed minimum income level, or a lump-sum minimum plus a percentage of gross 
receipts (TJN-A, 2012).  
6
 Where ‘larger firms [are] required to withhold taxes on their transactions with small firms, which is then remitted 
to government and credited against the future tax liabilities of those small firms’ (TJN-A, 2012, p.3) 
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Key readings 
Joshi, A., Prichard, W., & Heady, C. (2014). Taxing the Informal Economy: The Current 
State of Knowledge and Agendas for Future Research. The Journal of Development 
Studies. Advance online publication. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2014.940910  
This literature review provides an overview of the benefits and challenges of informal sector 
taxation through formalisation, taxing goods and services, withholding taxes and presumptive 
taxes. A “growing body of research” suggests that formalisation of firms, which allows them to be 
taxed, may have “significant benefits for growth, or, at the very least, may not hinder growth” (p. 
5).  Formalisation can enable access to credit, offer opportunities to engage with larger firms and 
the government, reduce harassment by police and government officials, and improve access to 
training and support programmes. Taxing the goods and services informal sector firms trade, for 
example through import and export taxes, may undermine country comparative advantage but 
would not impose compliance costs on informal sector firms. Neither would there be difficulties 
imposed by limited education on tax matters and capacity to deal with tax issues. While some 
countries gain significant revenue from withholding taxes they can be administratively 
burdensome, create incoherence in the tax system and discourage tax reform. A presumptive tax 
regime can mean firms pay substantially lower tax rates than the standard regime. This can 
mean forgone revenue as well as providing a disincentive for firms to graduate onto the standard 
regime.  
Joshi, A. & Ayee, J. (2008). Associational taxation: a pathway into the informal sector? In 
Brautigam, D., Fjeldstad, O.-H. & Moore, M. (eds). Taxation and State-Building in 
Developing Countries: Capacity and Consent. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
http://shebacss.com/ndsp/docs/cases/ndsp042.pdf  
This literature review outlines the associational taxation approach – delegating tax collection to 
unions, business or other associations – and identifies ways to improve informal sector taxation. 
Using this approach depends on the type of tax, the extent of revenue pressure on the 
government, the degree and nature of associationalism within the informal sector, and the 
channels of interaction with state institutions. To improve compliance it may help to shift away 
from organising tax administrations by locality and type of tax (sales taxes, property taxes and 
income taxes), towards organisation by type of taxpayer (e.g. large, middle and small taxpayers). 
Compliance can also be improved by reducing rates or offering rewards to firms that maintain 
effective records.  
de Mel, S., McKenzie, D. & Woodruff, C. (2013). The Demand for, and Consequences of, 
Formalization among Informal Firms in Sri Lanka. American Economic Journal: Applied 
Economics, 5(2), 122-50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.5.2.122   
This randomised controlled field trial in Sri Lanka looked at incentives for companies to register 
formally and the impacts of formalisation. The study found that providing informal firms with 
information about the registration process and reimbursement of direct costs did not increase 
registration. On the other hand, larger payments to informal firms in return for formalisation 
(equivalent to one-half to two months of profits) did lead to increased registration with the authors 
concluding formalisation is attributable to rational cost-benefit calculations. Land ownership 
issues were the most common reason for not registering. Follow-up surveys found that the firms 
that formalised only showed modest profit increase (except for a few rapidly growing firms which 
11 
profited more), but their owners had a more favourable attitude towards government as a result 
of formalisation.  
McKenzie, D. & Sakho, Y. (2010). Does it Pay Firms to Register for Taxes? The Impact of 
Formality on Firm Profitability. Journal of Development Economics 91(1), 15-24. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2009.02.003  
Using a quantitative analysis, this paper estimates the impact of tax registration on firms in 
Bolivia, the country with the highest levels of informality in Latin America. The study finds that tax 
registration can increase mid-sized firms’ profits, but lowers profits for smaller and larger firms.  
The mechanism seems to be that registration allows firms to issue tax receipts, which attracts 
customers who can claim tax refunds. Very small microenterprises often benefit least from tax 
registration, as registration costs often outweigh potential profits. 
6. Local taxation 
Local taxation – local government collecting and spending locally revenue from taxes, fees and 
charges –has until recently received little attention from the national tax agencies, aid agencies, 
and international organisations that have shaped the tax reform agenda (Moore, 2013a). 
However, at the local government level links between taxation and spending are potentially more 
direct, taxpayers are closer to government, and tax reform can be the leading edge of needed 
construction of state capacity (Prichard 2016). 
Local governments generally receive most of their funds from central government, but property 
taxes, business licenses, market fees and user charges can provide substantial and reliable 
revenue (Fjeldstadt, Chambas & Brun, 2014). Furthermore, local taxation can improve state-
society relations, at least at the local level. For example, a Sri Lankan randomised controlled 
study found that business owners whose firms formalised and paid local taxes showed increased 
trust in the provincial and municipal governments with whom they interacted with during 
registration, but no change in trust in central government (de Mel et al. 2013).  
There is little robust evidence of the impact of local taxation reform on revenue and state-building 
processes, or of the factors supporting reform efforts.  Suggested approaches to reform include: 
(1) simplification of systems and processes (e.g. property valuation, business licences, fee 
structures); (2) increasing transparency; (3) improving payment compliance (e.g. of user fees); 
(4) improved provision of information on taxation and fees; and (5) adopting a more pragmatic 
approach to local taxation, such as through segmentation
7
 (Fjeldstadt et al., 2014; Fjeldstadt & 
Heggstadt, 2013). It is important to take account the limited capacity of urban councils to 
undertake valuation and enforcement, and to ensure harmonisation between central and local 
government so as to avoid double taxation and inconsistent policies (Fjeldstadt et al., 2014; 
Fjeldstadt & Heggstadt, 2013). 
Barriers to strong tax-governance linkages at the local level include: weak government incentives 
and capacity to collective revenue; significant risk of elite capture and coercive taxation; the 
                                                   
7
 Tailoring legislation and administration of tax collection to different segments of the tax base. For example, if the 
tax base is segmented by firm size, small enterprise tax collection can involve simplifying related legislation and 
adapting administration to be as cost-effective as possible keeping in mind that revenues are likely to be 
comparatively small (Fjeldstadt et al., 2014). 
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difficulty of local level collective action; and the frequent pervasiveness of informality in local tax 
systems – including “informal taxation” by non-state actors (Prichard 2016). 
Key readings 
Fjeldstad, O-H., Chambas, G. & Brun, J. (2014). Local government taxation in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: A review and an agenda for research. CMI Working Paper WP 2014:2. Chr. 
Michelsen Institute (CMI). http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/5098-local-government-
taxation-in-sub-saharan-africa.pdf  
This literature review on local government revenue systems in Africa concludes that there is a 
need for consistent domestic tax legislation, a clear boundary between local and central taxation, 
and the principle of segmentation to be applied in local taxation as it has been at the national 
level. There is potential to increase local revenues from other types of taxes (e.g. consumption of 
utilities) and non-tax revenue sources (e.g. fees, levies) but tax legislation must be kept as 
simple as possible to prevent overburdening local governments. Sharing revenues between local 
and central government can ensure better service provision but this must not introduce 
uncertainties for local governments on the amounts they expect and/or on the timing of the 
transfers.  
Fjeldstad, O-H. & Heggstad, K.  (2013). Local Government Revenue Mobilisation in 
Anglophone Africa. ICTD Research in Brief. Issue 5. Brighton: International Centre for Tax 
and Development (ICTD). http://ictd.ac/sites/default/files/ICTD_RiB_%235_3.1.pdf  
This literature review examines opportunities and constraints facing local revenue mobilisation in 
Anglophone Africa. The paper finds that local government taxation not only brings in revenue, but 
can also play an important role in shaping state-society relations because it brings many people 
into direct contact with public authorities. The main sources of revenue for urban municipalities, 
other than central government transfers, are usually property taxes, business licenses, market 
fees and various user charges. For property tax, constraints include weak capacity to implement 
accurate valuation practices; poor collection; lack of clear ownership titles; and lack of political 
support for enforcement. Business licenses create high compliance costs due to complex 
procedures; may not reflect ability to pay; provide opportunities for rent seeking; and are often 
poorly administered. User fees may encourage efficient use of public sector resources but also 
suffer from defects including inequitable burdens on low income users, ineffective collection and 
billing arrangements, poor quality services and persistent resistance to payment. 
Moore, M. (2013). Obstacles to Increasing Tax Revenues in Low Income Countries. ICTD 
Working Paper 15. http://ictd.ac/sites/default/files/ICTD%20WP15.pdf  
Why do the governments of low income countries not raise more tax revenues? This literature 
review looks at various approaches, particularly highlighting the potential of property taxes, which 
globally are the dominant form of local taxation. Property taxes do not significantly distort 
investment decisions, and tend to fall on those better able to pay. They are consistently 
underused in low-income countries, and have been declining in relative importance even in those 
countries where they were historically relatively important. There are challenges to implementing 
property taxes as they tend to fall most on politically active and influential social groups.  
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7. Aid modalities and aid-funded goods and services 
Aid can either reinforce or undermine tax systems and tax culture, depending on how it is 
channelled.  International guidance suggests that donors should combine different aid modalities, 
adjusting them to local conditions (OECD, 2013c). These should be coherent and coordinated, 
and ensure ownership and alignment with partner country government preferences. Guidance 
also suggests that donors ensure transparency within the recipient country regardless of the aid 
modality employed, and make more use of graduated funding mechanisms with revenue-related 
triggers (variable tranches, cash-on-delivery) (OECD, 2013c). Donors should be prepared to 
disengage when aid for tax support does not achieve results, but there should be realistic 
expectations to avoid suddenly cutting off support. No single aid modality is always most 
effective in shifting elite incentives in relation to taxation.  There are concerns that general budget 
support may weaken incentives for revenue mobilisation, although empirical evidence of this is 
inconclusive. 
The use of tax exemptions on aid-funded goods and services has long been discussed in the 
international community (UN, 2005; ITD, 2006) and there is a strong consensus that they are 
undesirable (Diallo, 2013; Prichard et al., 2012; Fjeldstadt, 2009; MFA, 2013). While there is 
evidence on the impact of tax exemptions in general (see section 2.1) there is limited evidence 
specifically on tax exemptions of aid-funded goods and services. Prichard et al. (2012) argue that 
by paying tax on aid-funded goods and services, donors can reinforce the norm of tax 
compliance, reinforce the quality of tax systems and reduce administration costs in developing 
countries. Diallo (2013) notes that removing tax exemptions could help to make tax systems 
simpler, reduce management costs, minimise the risk of tax fraud and strengthen the neutrality of 
sales taxes, such as VAT. On the other hand, tax exemptions for aid funds can help ensure that 
Case Study: (Semi-)autonomous revenue authorities ((S)ARAs): Mixed outcomes 
A study on local tax collection in Peru found that municipalities with semi-autonomous 
revenue agencies (SARAs) collect more revenue than those with conventional tax 
administrations (von Haldenwang et al., 2014). The results also indicate that local revenue is 
more stable in municipalities with SARAs, which is good for budget policy and planning. 
Evidence, overall on (S)ARAs has been mixed (Fjeldstadt, 2013). While some have made 
impressive advances, other revenue authorities have seen little progress, or initial progress 
followed by stagnation. This is attributable to (S)ARAs being quite diverse in terms of revenue 
authority model; being mostly new and evolving; and having been introduced in part at the 
urging of aid donors and international financial institutions. 
von Haldenwang, C., von Schiller, A., & Garcia, M. (2014). Tax Collection in Developing 
Countries – New Evidence on Semi-Autonomous Revenue Agencies (SARAs). The 
Journal of Development Studies, 50(4), 541-555.  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2013.875534   
Fjeldstad, O-H. (2013). Taxation and development: A review of donor support to 
strengthen tax systems in developing countries. UNU-WIDER Research Paper 
WP2013/010. http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/4720-taxation-and-development.pdf  
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the funds achieve their intended purpose, and removing them would require coordinated action 
by all donors to avoid price, cost and access disadvantages which would impact on development 
outcomes (O'Brien, in International Development Committee, 2012). Some bilateral (Denmark, 
Norway) and multilateral (World Bank) donors no longer require tax exemptions (MFA, 2012). 
Key readings 
OECD. (2013c). Tax and Development: Aid Modalities for Strengthening Tax Systems. 
Paris: OECD. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264177581-en  
This OECD publication provides practical guidance for policy makers and practitioners based on 
the results of a literature review, a survey of aid agency officials and six country case studies 
(Ghana, Guatemala, Liberia, Mali, Mozambique, and Tanzania). The study examined seven aid 
modalities for supporting tax programmes and highlights the following strengths and 
weaknesses: (1) General budget support is useful in conditions of good public financial 
management capacity, it aligns support with national priorities, but may weaken incentives for 
domestic revenue mobilisation. (2) Sector budget support has similar strengths and weaknesses 
similar to general budget support, it creates direct links between funding and PFM performance, 
and is highly effective for coordinating donor work on revenue issues (3) Basket financing is well 
suited to coordinating multi-donor funding for tax programmes, but is less closely aligned with 
country systems than budget support. (4) Other multi-donor instruments such as multi-donor trust 
funds can be used for coordination though basket funding is preferable where there is adequate 
local management capacity. (5) Bilateral projects or programmes carry risks of lack of 
coordination among donors, and of being donor- rather than country-led, but can be effective if 
the recipient country exercises strong ownership and leadership. (6) Triangular cooperation can 
be comparatively lower in costs than other forms of technical assistance, although there are 
limits to countries’ absorptive capacity. (7) In-kind support can be more responsive to recipient 
country needs than donor-led interventions.  
Diallo, I. (2013, March 14). Tax exemptions for aid-funded projects: reasons for change. 
International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD) Blog. http://www.ictd.ac/en/tax-
exemptions-aid-funded-projects-reasons-change  
This opinion piece by a Senegalese tax official outlines the use of, and problems with, tax 
exemptions of aid-funded goods. Tax exemptions for aid-funded projects are mainly VAT, 
customs duties, excise duties, and registration fees. For recipient countries, granting tax 
exemptions are effectively a conditionality tied to aid rather than a political choice. While the aid 
helps provide public goods with economic and social benefits, there is still a forgoing of 
significant tax revenue. Tax exemptions, including those for aid-funded projects, result in more 
complex tax systems, additional management costs both for tax payers and tax administrations, 
risks of tax fraud, and restrictions on the right to refunds affecting the neutrality of VAT. Paying 
taxes on aid-funded goods and services essentially acts as budget support, which is widely 
agreed by donors to be the preferable modality as it allows funds to be used to  finance national 
priorities and reinforces public financial management systems. The official concludes that 
reviewing tax exemptions for aid-financed projects should be a priority. 
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8. Tax administration capacity development 
The importance of building administrative capacity is strongly emphasised in the literature and by 
experts.  Giulia Mascagni of the International Centre for Tax and Development notes that there 
are many small, incremental reforms that would be quite effective in increasing tax capacity and 
the overall performance of the system, such as building better data management systems, 
making sure datasets from different institutions and within the same institution are connected and 
communicate with each other, and introducing automatic enrolment incentives such as a legal 
requirement to present tax registration information for services like taking out a loan, buying a 
house, and opening a bank account (Giulia Mascagni 2017, personal communication).  Relevant 
government departments must be linked effectively (Rhiannon McCluskey 2017, personal 
communication).  Reorganisation of revenue administration according to taxpayer size rather 
than tax type has also been a successful innovation (Kloeden, 2011; Rhiannon McCluskey 2017 
personal communication). 
Draft proposals for strengthening tax administration capacity from the Effective Institutions 
Platform (EIP, n.d.) include: basing efforts on comprehensive analysis; adapting to context; 
supporting national priorities, ownership and leadership; addressing international, national and 
sub-national levels; engaging with a broad range of stakeholders both inside and outside 
government; and supporting principles of accountability, transparency, and participation. The EIP 
highlights training, South-South cooperation, and natural resource taxation as being particularly 
relevant for developing countries. 
Countries vary widely in tax capacity and different countries will require different capacity building 
strategies for increasing revenue (Moore et al., 2015).  A range of case studies from different 
countries has shown a diversity of approaches being used to varying effect.   
 Experimental evidence from Ethiopia finds electronic sales registry machines result in 
significantly higher tax payments as firms are less able to evade (Ali et al., 2015).   
 In Paraguay, modernisation of procedures and improved enforcement of collection 
improved compliance and increased revenues (ITC-OECD, 2015).  
 Setting up tax units specifically for high net worth individuals is currently being explored 
in Uganda (Kangave, 2016).  
 In Rwanda, tax revenue as a share of GDP rose by about half between 2001 and 2013 
(ITC-OECD, 2015) when new income tax laws were introduced and customs reform put 
in place. The increases were enabled by improved legislation and strengthened 
administration as well as a broadening of the tax base.  
 The success of customs reform in Cameroon were thought to hinge on enhanced 
administration and systems (Raballand and Rajaram, 2013).  Communications between 
the head of customs and frontline officers were improved, information communication 
technology modernised, and performance contracts (using non-financial incentives to 
avoid corruption) put in place.  
Barriers to administrative reforms may arise partly because of political will and partly because 
staff are not sufficiently equipped or are overwhelmed with other more pressing issues such as 
achieving immediate revenue targets.  Retention of staff with important IT, accounting, and 
forensic auditing skills is important (Moore et al., 2015) but high demand for skills in the private 
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sector tends to lead to high staff turnover in tax administrations (Rhiannon McCluskey 2017, 
personal communication).  There is some danger that businesses may evade taxes by moving to 
the informal sector (Morrissey, 2015).   
In Uganda, for example, the past few years have been characterised with increased movement 
of senior revenue officials from the Uganda Revenue Authority to other government agencies.  
This is partly due to better pay in other agencies, but also because in some cases contract terms 
(for commissioners) require that the person cannot serve for more than a certain number of 
years. This increases the need for building capacity, particularly of lower level staff.  There is also 
a feeling within the Uganda Revenue Authority itself that staff are not allowed to develop capacity 
because they can be moved from one position to another with little warning.  Management 
perceives these movements as necessary to guard against corruption, but there is also a need to 
balance this with the objective of capacity building (Kangave, personal communication, 2017). 
Interest in South-South cooperation for capacity building in tax administration has been growing 
recently.  A recent OECD report describes South-South cooperation as a “low-cost, high-value 
channel” and recommends “strong support from the international community” although noting 
that there can be limits to partners’ absorptive capacity (OECD, 2013, p. 15).  The UN’s South-
South Sharing of Successful Tax Practices for Development (S4TP) initiative aims to identify and 
disseminate successful Southern practices in tax policy and administration, identify opportunities 
for cooperation, and build awareness of the value of South-South exchange, particularly in 
working on illicit financial flows, tax training, transfer pricing, and taxation and climate change. 
The Capacity Development Programme on International Tax Cooperation is another UN 
programme, overseen by the Financing for Development Office, for strengthening the capacity of 
ministries of finance and national tax authorities in developing countries (UN, 2013b).  It 
organises training and guidance material on international double taxation agreements, 
broadening the tax base and transfer pricing (UN, 2014).   
Key readings 
Holmes, K., Ndihokubwayo, D. & Ruvakubusa, C. (2013). For State and Citizen: Reforming 
Revenue Administration in Burundi. Policy Voices Series. Africa Research Institute.  
http://www.africaresearchinstitute.org/newsite/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/For-State-and-
Citizen-Reforming-revenue-administration-in-Burundi-Final.pdf  
This case study was produced by current and former senior officials of the semi-autonomous tax 
collection institution of Burundi (Office Burundais des Recettes, OBR), which was set up in 2009. 
The paper describes how tax collection and administration was reformed in Burundi to reduce 
corruption, improve services, implement legislative reforms and widen the tax base. Conclusions 
and recommendations for the OBR are: closer co-operation between the OBR and local 
authorities in order to widen the tax base in the regions; provisions for offering revenue 
exemptions should be collated and re-examined; improvement of OBR communications; a 
comprehensive transparency and anti-corruption campaign, supported by government agencies 
as well as the OBR; a more diversified external funding structure to help the OBR to pursue 
multiple objectives simultaneously; and the denial of access to public services and tenders to 
anyone who is not tax compliant.  
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Bennet, R. (2012). A Change Agent in the Tax Office: Nigeria’s Federal Inland Revenue 
Service, 2004-2009. Policy Note ID184, Innovations for Successful Societies, Princeton 
University. https://www.princeton.edu/successfulsocieties/policynotes/view.xml?id=184  
This case study examines the reform of the Nigerian Federal Inland Revenue Service in 2004.  A 
new executive chairperson was appointed and tasked with reforming the agency and diversifying 
tax collection to reduce dependence on oil revenue. The case study describes how the 
chairperson overcame opposition from private consultants who benefited from the existing 
system, defeated institutional inertia, and reduced corruption. Steps toward capacity 
development included establishing control over staff recruitment independently from the Federal 
Civil Service Commission, improving training using a mix of domestic and international 
consultants, reorganising and integrating departments and offices, simplifying interactions with 
taxpayers, increasing automation, working with banks to process payments, upgrading computer 
equipment, and setting up a new internal unit to fight corruption. 
Danida & Bhutan Department of Revenue and Customs (2011). Bhutan: Building 
capacities to build revenues. In Woodhatch, T., Casazza, A., Lucas, B., & Werter, F. (eds.), 
Capacity Results: Case stories on capacity development and sustainable results. 
Learning Network on Capacity Development and IBON Foundation. 
http://www.lencd.org/files/group/busan/document/2011/Capacity_Results:_Case_stories_o
n_capacity_development_and_sustainable_results/Capacity-Results-web.pdf  
This short case study covers Bhutan’s attempts to broaden the tax base by introducing personal 
income tax and improving collection of other direct taxes. The Bhutan Department of Revenue 
and Customs achieved efficiencies through decentralisation to regional offices, training, 
upgrading IT systems, and public education on compliance. There was also intensive in-country 
training and professional development in revenue administration, and the introduction of a new IT 
system for tax and customs have improved tax administration. Capacity development efforts 
have been supported by strong and stable leadership within the Department, by Danish financial 
support which was aligned with the national-driven strategy, and by technical assistance to 
support the drafting of legislation and the introduction of new IT systems. 
UNDP. (2008). Revenue’s Role in the Quest for Inclusive Development, What Works and 
What Can Work Better? UNDP. http://ww2.s4tp.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/10/InclusiveDev.pdf  
This publication includes a meeting report and case studies presented at a 2008 conference on 
‘South-South Sharing of Successful Tax Practices’ by experts and administrators from different 
countries, international organisations and campaigning organisations. The meeting report 
highlights a number of focus areas for capacity building including: developing a database of 
recognised tax experts in particular fields; promoting practical case-study-driven training 
sessions; disseminating successful practices effective in developing skills and keeping expertise 
within tax administrations; promoting the need to fully understand the impact of tax incentives 
designed to attract investment; promoting ongoing beneficial exchange of experiences, both what 
has worked and what has not. The meeting highlighted a need to improve developing country 
capacity on issues such as transfer pricing, comparative tax law, and countering cross border tax 
evasion. An international tax appeal tribunal was suggested in place of arbitration clauses in Tax 
Treaties. 
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